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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses issues of mediation as a means of 
employment dispute resolution. It covers basic information about 
alternative dispute resolution in general and mediation in particular. 
The main problem is the question whether good faith requirements 
apply in mediation under current New Zealand employment law. This 
question is interesting concerning sections 181 and 182 of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000, which make it possible that the 
Employment Court may request a "report in relation to good faith" 
from the Employment Relations Authority. Interestingly, there does 
not exist such a rule for mediation processes. The question whether 
good faith requirements apply is of particular importance regarding 
secondary claims based on a breach of good faith requirements. Apart 
from that bad faith behaviour might endanger the quality of mediation 
in general. In order to find an answer to this question a definition of 
good faith behaviour in mediation is sought and the question of 
sanctions for bad faith behaviour is analysed. Problems arise because 
it is already hard to define mediation and good faith is even harder to 
specify. Finally, this paper argues in favour of the applicability of 
good faith requirements in mediation and suggests a code of conduct. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents pages, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 12, OOO words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with some aspects of mediation in the 
employment law context. The main problem outlined is the question 
whether good faith requirements apply in mediation. 
The first part of the paper gives an overview about available 
dispute resolution processes. This introduction also covers methods of 
alternative dispute resolution and leads to the classification of 
mediation as a method of alternative dispute resolution. Thereafter 
mediation is defined in detail. Defining mediation is a problem. That 
starts with finding an appropriate approach. Another issue is where to 
put the emphasis. Some definitions, for example, focus rather on the 
achievable outcome. This chapter also names some official definitions 
of mediation and names objectives of mediation. There are a variety of 
mediation types. The problems in defining mediation also occur 
because of the differences between those types. The most important 
types are described briefly. Finally the first chapter outlines which 
outcomes can be achieved by mediation. In the end, parties make their 
decision about the appropriate dispute resolution process last but not 
least in regard of the outcome they might achieve with the process. 
The second part of the paper outlines the basic procedures of 
employment dispute resolution under the Employment Relations Act 
2000 in New Zealand. It describes the possibility of using the 
mediation service and the availability of private mediation under the 
Act. Furthermore this chapter names the kinds of employment 
disputes that seem suitable to be resolved by mediation. 
An important part of the employment dispute resolution 
system in New Zealand is the Employment Relations Authority. 
Before I come to the main problem discussed in the paper I will give a 
brief overview about the Authority because I will come back to 
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function of the Employment Relations Authority during the discussion 
of the problem. 
In the third part I will analyse the main problem of the paper. 
The question is whether good faith requirements apply to mediation in 
general and more specifically whether the good faith requirement of 
the New Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000 applies to 
mediation of employment disputes. Issues arise regarding sections 181 
and 182 of the Employment Relations Act 2000. These provisions 
deal with good faith behaviour and apply to the process before the 
Employment Relations Authority. The question is whether the absence 
of similar rules for mediation means that the Act's good faith 
requirements do not apply to mediation. The discussion of the 
problems starts again with the outlining of definition problems. It is 
hard to determine which factors establish good or bad faith behaviour 
in mediation. Therefore some possible approaches and examples are 
outlined. After one has described bad faith behaviour in mediation one 
can question the next problematic issue. This is whether bad faith 
behaviour in mediation is subject to sanction. This is a controversially 
discussed question. There are strong proponents of both the pro 
sanction and the contra sanction side. Their conflicting arguments are 
outlined. After that I present a compromise approach. Considering the 
major adverse impact that bad faith behaviour can have on the 
mediation process and its participants one can argue that the less bad 
faith behaviour occurs during a mediation the more satisfied will the 
parties be with the result. Finally it is to argue whether there is a need 
for good faith requirements in mediation. To bring more clarity into 
the problem it will be shown that it is sensible to draw a distinction 
between objective and subjective factors. After that, the most 
important problems with punishing subjective bad faith behaviour will 
be outlined. Problems occur regarding confidentiality, litigation, open 
expression and voluntariness. A proposed code of good faith for 
mediation is briefly outlined at the end of this chapter 
3 
Finally, I will come to the conclusion that it is generally 
possible that good faith standards apply in mediation. Furthermore, it 
will be shown that the current New Zealand employment law does not 
exclude good faith standards from mediation. 
II DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
The traditional process of dispute resolution is adjudication. Its 
characteristics are as follows: Adjudication is an involuntary process, 
decisions are binding and subject to appeal and third party 
participation is imposed. This third party is a neutral decision-maker 
and has generally no specialised expertise in the dispute subject. 
Adjudication is a formalised process and highly structured by 
predetermined, rigid rules . Each party gets the opportunity to present 
proofs and arguments. The process leads to a principled decision that 
is supported by a reasoned opinion as outcome. The process of 
adjudication is public 1• 
In contrast to adjudication alternative dispute resolution is 
voluntary and usually private. Alternative dispute resolution may 
serve as a means to avoid costly litigation. It consists of at least three 
elements: negotiation, mediation and arbitration. 
A Negotiation 
Negotiation is the most informal, least expensive method of 
resolving disputes. It is a not-binding process. However, if an 
agreement is achieved, the result of a negotiation process 1s 
enforceable as a contract. Negotiation does not include the facilitation 
of a third party. It is usually an inforn1al and unstructured process. The 
1 Stephen B Goldberg, Eric D Green, Frank E A Sander Dispute Resolution (Little 
Brown and Company, Boston Toronto, 1985) 8. 
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proceeding is characterised by an unbounded presentation of evidence, 
arguments and interests. The sought outcome of a negotiation process 
is a mutually acceptable agreement
2
. 
B Mediation 
Mediation is a private and voluntary process of alternative 
dispute resolution. It is a more forn1al yet non-binding process. It uses 
a party selected outside facilitator - the neutral mediator - to help 
negotiate a dispute settlement. The mediator usually has specialised 
subject expertise. During the mediation process the parties have the 
possibility to present evidence, arguments and interests. As in the 
negotiation process the presentation of evidence is unbounded. Once 
an agreement is reached through consent of the parties, it is generally 
binding on the participants and the sought outcome of the process is a 
mutually acceptable agreement. The process of mediation will be 
outlined in detail later3 in this paper. 
C Arbitration 
Arbitration is also a voluntary process. Arbitration is binding 
and can be subject to review on limited grounds. In contrast to the 
other processes of alternative dispute resolution arbitration is not 
stringently private. If a judicial review is sought, the process is no 
longer private. Arbitration involves a party selected third party 
decision-maker. He or she has usually specialised subject expertise. 
Arbitration is in comparison to adjudication procedurally less formal. 
The parties may set the procedural rules and substantive law. Each 
party has the opportunity to present proofs and arguments. The 
2 
Stephen B Goldberg, Eric D Green, Frank E A Sander Dispute Resolution (Little 
Brown and Company, Boston Toronto, 1985) 8. 
3 Refer to page 7. 
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outcome of a arbitration process may sometimes be a principled 
decision supported by reasoned opinion. However, in other cases the 
outcome is a compromise without a reasoned opinion4 . A special case 
is court-annexed arbitration. This is an involuntary process. Court-
annexed arbitration is non-binding and public. In general, one can say 
that arbitration is a means of reaching a final, binding resolution of 
disputes that cannot be solved through more informal techniques. It is 
viewed as less costly and more effective than litigation. Sometimes 
non-binding arbitration is imposed by court procedures. The use of 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses is gaining increased acceptance. Such 
clauses are generally recognised as a legitimate means to avoiding the 
litigation of employment related disputes. However, in the special 
case of employment disputes the employer has to follow certain 
guidelines to achieve this goal. Careful drafting of arbitration clauses 
is a key to a successful arbitration process. 
Arbitration has long held a place in New Zealand employment 
dispute resolution. That place has in part been retained in section 155 
of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Problems arise because the 
Arbitration Act 1996 does not apply although section 155(1) allows 
parties of an employment agreement to submit employment 
relationship problems to arbitration. The parties then must determine 
their own procedure for the arbitration. Furthermore, there is no means 
of enforcing the award. An award is a determination, not a settlement, 
so the provisions of section 149 cannot apply. Section 150, concerned 
with the mediator becoming the determiner, can have no application, 
for that provision only applies to persons employed or engaged by the 
chief executive of a department to provide mediation services. The 
arbitrator, on the other hand, will have been appointed expressly to 
arbitrate, not to mediate. A solution may be found in section l 55(3)(b) 
which provides that the submission of an employment relationship 
problem to arbitration does not otherwise affect the application of the 
4 Stephen B Goldberg, Eric D Green, Frank E A Sander Dispute Resolution (Little 
Brown and Company, Boston Toronto, 1985) 8. 
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Act. Assuming that the parties have seriously attempted mediation, 
which proved to be unsuccessful before entering the arbitration, then 
the arbitral award may be enforceable by either pa1iy applying to the 
Employment Relations Authority to confirn1 it and adopt it as a 
detennination order and/ or direction of the Authority. 
5 
Once the 
Authority has adopted the award then it can be subject to the 
compliance provisions of the Act. 6 As this procedure is less than ideal, 
arbitration is not of great importance for employment dispute 
resolution in New Zealand anymore. 
D Other Processes 
The presented processes of dispute resolution are the so-called 
"primary" dispute resolution processes. Each of the primary processes 
can be used in its own right without adaptation. 
7 Apart from these, 
there are other processes, which are called "hybrid" dispute resolution 
processes. Hybrid processes are combinations of usage of the primary 
processes. They were developed by drawing elements from the 
primary processes and making them suitable for a particular case. The 
advantage is that an alternative dispute resolution practitioner can 
devise a permutation of procedures and approaches, which fit all the 
nuances of the parties' needs and circumstances without being 
constrained by prescribed rules. 8 Among hybrid processes are the 
following: private judging, neutral expert fact-finding and mini trial.9 
Furthermore there is an ombudsman procedure, whereas one may not 
mistake this alternative dispute resolution process for the process 
involving a statutory ombudsman. Mainly in the United States of 
5 Employment Relations Act 2000 section 161(1)(r) . 
6 
Employment Relations Act 2000 sections 137-138 and Phillip D Green 
fmployment Dispute Resoluhon (LexisNexis Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 78. 
Henry Brown, Arthur Marnot ADR Principles and Practise (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1993) 19. 
8 
Henry Brown, Arthur Marriot ADR Principles and Practise (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1993) 20. 
9 
Stephen B Goldberg, Eric D Green, Frank EA Sander Dispute Resolution (Little 
Brown and Company, Boston Toronto, 1985) 9. 
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America one also knows a summary jury trial as hybrid alternative 
dispute resolution process and early neutral evaluation 1°. 
III MEDIATION IN DETAIL 
A Definition 
Some characteristics of mediation were already outlined 
above' 1• Nevertheless mediation is not easy to define. The difficulties 
in defining mediation arise because it does not provide a single 
analytical model, which can be neatly described and distinguished 
from other decision-making processes. This difficulty is caused by a 
variety of factors. The first one is that in defining mediation there are 
often very vague terms used, as for example voluntary or neutrality. 
These terms can never provide certainty because they are subject to 
change and various interpretations themselves. Another reason for the 
difficulties in defining mediation is that it has yet to develop a 
coherent theoretical base and an accepted set of core features which 
enable it to be differentiated from other processes of alternative 
dispute resolution. Another reason that may not be underestimated is 
that different users use the term mediation in different senses. 
Mediation is used in a variety of areas and so factors such as 
economics, politics and self-interest exert their influence on the 
definition. People define and describe mediation for their own 
purposes. Another aspect, which is tightly linked with the last reason, 
is the fact that there is a wide diversity in the practise of mediation. 
Mediation is - as already mentioned - used for different purposes. It 
operates in different legal and social contexts. The mediators in all 
10 Henry Brown, Arthur Marriot ADR Principles and Practise (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 1993) 20. 
11 Refer to page 4. 
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these different areas have great differences m their background, 
training, level of skill and operational style.
12 
Considering this one can approach mediation as a process - a 
"infinitely variable process, yet with common strands".
13 
Mediation is 
ari extension of the negotiation process. The mediator helps the parties 
by facilitating continued negotiation in a mariaged way. 
14 
This makes 
the enormous influence of the mediator's personal skills can have on 
the prospect of a good outcome clear. 
Other definitions are more dispute resolution focused with 
emphasis on achieving outcomes that are accepted by the parties, but 
which not necessarily resolve the dispute.
15 
Furthermore, it is possible to define mediation in either a 
descriptive or a conceptual way. Conceptualist definitions have a high 
normative content. The process is defined in ideal terms that 
emphasise certain values, principles and objectives. In this manner, 
mediation was defined as "the bringing together of parties in conflict 
with a neutral person or persons whose function is to assist the parties 
to resolve the dispute through the systematic isolation of issues and 
development of settlement options to achieve a consensual 
accommodation of needs". 16 This definition was criticised as being 
simplistic because even when the dispute cannot be settled there is till 
a role to be played by the mediator. This role will include seeking to 
reduce the matters in issue and encouraging the parties towards an 
12 
Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 3. 
13 
Phillip D Green Employment Dispute Resolution (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) 1. 
14 
Phillip D Green Employment Dispute Resolution (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) 1. 
15 
National Working Party on Mediation Guidelines for Family Mediation: 
Pr,eveloping Services for Ao~earoa/ New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1996). 
J Folberg, A Taylor Medzatwn: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflict 
without Litigation (Jossey Bass, San Francisco, 1988) 7. 
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understanding of the opposing points of view.17 Other conceptualist 
definitions assert that mediation "is empowering for the parties", that 
it "reflects an alternative philosophy of conflict management", or that 
it strives to "improve relationships between the parties". 18 These 
definitions can also be criticised because although these goals are 
aspired to and achieved in some mediations - however, in other 
mediations they are neither in evidence nor are they contemplated by 
those involved. Therefore the critic is that it be misleading to include 
without qualification such factors in the definition of mediation.
19 The 
conceptualist approach has the advantage that it highlights for users 
and practitioners the higher goals and values of mediation. These 
goals and values differentiate mediation from other process of dispute 
resolution and decision making. However, the main disadvantage is 
that the conceptualist approach is an ideological and not an empirical 
approach to the definition of mediation. That means, it tends to pass 
off the prescriptive elements of mediation because it regards them as 
descriptive. 20 
A descriptive approach has the advantage that it provides an 
explanation of the process. The descriptive approach defines 
mediation not in terms of an idealised concept or theory, but in terms 
of what actually happens in practise. Descriptive definitions have a 
low normative content. They accept that within the wide diversity of 
mediation practice, the values, principles and objectives of the 
conceptualists are often overlooked and overridden.
21 The strength of 
this approach is that it is based on practise and therefore reflects 
reality. Using the descriptive approach, mediation was defined for 
17 Phillip D Green Employment Dispute Resolution (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) 2. 
18 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation : Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 5. 
19 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 5. 
20 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation : Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 5. 
2 1 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 5. 
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example, as "a process of dispute resolution in which the disputants 
meet with the mediator to talk over and then attempt to settle their 
differences."22 The main disadvantage of this approach is that it 
provides a very superficial and unhelpful definition. The definition is 
free of values. That is dangerous in so far as it overlooks the 
underlying philosophy of mediation. 
23 
There are some official definitions of mediations. They are 
outlined in statues, rules of court and codes of conduct for mediators. 
Though the practical use of these definitions is often doubtful. As an 
example the Australian Federal Court Rules define the term as 
"mediation means mediation conducted under a mediation order".
24 
However, there are also more helpful definitions of mediation. The 
Australian Family Law rules, for example, provide that a mediation 
conference must be conducted "as a decision making process in which 
the approved mediator assists the parties by facilitating discussions 
between them so that they may: communicate with each other 
regarding the matters in dispute; and find satisfactory solutions which 
are fair to each of the parties and (if relevant) the children; and reach 
agreement on matters in dispute."25 
As a principle one can summarise under consideration of this 
wide variety of definitions of and approaches to mediation that there 
are some basic features of mediation. One could summarise mediation 
as "a decision making process in which the parties are assisted by a 
third party, the mediator. The mediator attempts to improve the 
process of decision making and to assist the parties reach an outcome 
to which each of them can assent."26 Furthermore, mediation has also 
secondary objectives apart from the principal objective of making a 
22 M Roberts "System or Selves? Some Ethical Issues in Family Mediation" (1992) 
10 MQ 11. 
23 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation : Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington 1998) 5. ~ ' 
Australian Federal Court Rules O 2 r 4. 
25 Australian Family Law Rules r lO( l)(a). 
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decision. Inter alia these secondary objectives characterise mediation 
and distinguish it from other decision-making processes. Boule, Jones 
and Goldblatt provide substantial list27 of secondary objectives of 
mediation. It will be to examine whether mediation in employment 
law as it is practised in New Zealand is able to achieve these 
objectives: 
Mediation shall bring clarity to the situation by identifying and 
defining which matters do or do not require decisions to be made. 
Mediation shall overcome or reduce communication problems 
between the parties so that they can more clearly perceive and 
understand what each other means and feels . 
Mediation shall identify and acknowledge the various parties' 
needs and interests, whether they are substantive, procedural or 
psychological. 
Mediation shall promote constructive and efficient 
negotiations, which focus predominantly on the parties' needs and 
interests, and which broaden the search for options and settlement 
alternatives. 
Mediation shall reduce anxiety and other negative effects of 
the problem situation and to be empowering for the parties so that 
informed and rational decision-making can take place. 
Mediation shall encourage the parties to take charge of their 
own decisions and to accept responsibility for the consequences of 
those decisions. 
26 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 3. 
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Mediation shall reduce tension and improve, or at least not 
lead to deterioration, in relationships between the parties. 
Mediation shall provide the parties with a model and some 
skills and techniques, for future decision-making without third party 
assistance. 
B Types of Mediation 
An important aspect is that some of the problems of definition 
are a result of the contrast between private mediation and the different 
forms of institutionalised mediation. Definitions and descriptions of 
mediation tend to have only private mediation in mind. 
Private mediations are often well resourced. They have few 
time limitations. Generally they are conducted by well-qualified 
mediators, who can exploit the potential of the mediation system in 
full. 28 
Institutionalised mediation is mediation, which is connected to 
the courts or are required by statute. Some forms of institutionalised 
mediation do not have any of the named typical features of private 
mediation. The process can even be "poor, nasty, brutish and short"29 
- as to cite one of the early critics of institutionalised mediation. 
27 
Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 8-9. 
28 
Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 4. 
29 
T Hobbes Leviathan (Everyman Edition, JM Dent and Sons, London, 1962) 65 . 
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C Purpose of Mediatio1t 
Mediation can be used for a variety of purposes, which are 
described in the following. It will be interesting to find out which of 
these possible fields of mediation use may be useful in employment 
disputes. 
1 Defi1ti1tg problems 
Sometimes it is necessary to determine which issues are in 
dispute and which are not. This process is also called "scoping", 
therefore this kind of mediation is called "scoping mediation". 
Mediation can be used to define the problem before it will be referred 
to other methods of dispute resolution. Those can be litigation or a 
public inquiry. Scoping is used environmental disputes in New 
Zealand for example. The advantage of involving mediation into the 
dispute resolution process is that it allows the parties to define the 
problem without the pressure to compromise their interests. 
30 
2 Dispute settleme1tt 
Dispute settlement mediation takes place in the context of a 
dispute between two or more parties and is used in an attempt to settle 
the dispute. The special advantage of mediation is that even where the 
dispute is not settled by the mediation itself, the process may 
contribute to the management of the dispute in other ways. However, 
the main objective of dispute settlement mediation remains to bring 
the dispute to an end through a joint decision making by the parties
31
. 
30 Lamence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 12. 
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3 Conflict management 
Mediation can also be used to manage conflict, as conflict 
containment mediation. One speaks of a conflict if there has been an 
ongoing series of disputes of severe intensity and if this has been 
going on over an extended period of time.32 Mediation can even be 
helpful in cases where it is known that the conflict will continue. It 
can help establishing appropriate rules, structures and processes for 
communication and interaction. Mediation is able to regulate the 
conduct of the parties in the short term. That serves the long term 
objective of dealing with the dispute, although the long-term objective 
will finally be achieved by another means of dispute resolution.33 
4 Negotiation of contracts 
Mediation can already be used before a dispute occurs. 
Transactional mediation is used to manage procedures during the 
negotiations and to provide ways of dealing with disputes should they 
arise during the future contractual relationship between the parties. 
The mediator can help for example in establishing a positive climate, 
identifying interests and priorities, improving communications, 
managing destructive emotions, formulating proposals, narrowing 
options and noting and recording agreements. 34 
3 1 
Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation : Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 12. 
32 
Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 12. 
33 
W Faulkes "The Dispute Resolution Industry - Defining the Industry and 
Establishing Competencies" (1994) 5 ADRJ 285, 287. 
34 
Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation : Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 13. 
15 
5 Policy formulating 
Policy-making mediation can be used where a public authority 
is required to determine policy, standards or procedures in rules and 
regulations. This process allows a participation of the affected parties 
and interested members of the public and is in some countries used to 
develop environmental and health and safety standards. 35 
6 Prevention of conflicts 
Preventative mediation can be used to assist parties to 
anticipate problems, grievances and difficulties and to plan processes 
for dealing with them when they arise. 36 Partly both transactional and 
policy-making mediation involve elements of conflict prevention. 
7 Subsidiary purposes 
Apart from the named achievements mediation can also serve 
other purposes, for example as an educational tool in decision-making, 
as a managerial tool37 , as filtering mechanism in the litigation process 
and to negotiate the facts - that means the parties develop a common 
version of the facts of the case. 38 
For detennining the appropriate dispute resolution process a 
variety of factors are to consider. Among these are: the relationship 
35 L Susskind and G McMahon "The Theory and Practise of Negotiated 
Rulemaking" (1985) 3 Yale Journal of Regulation 133. 
36 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 14. 
37 A Acland A Sudden Outbreak of Common Sense: Managing Conflict through 
Mediation (Hutchinson, London, 1990) 15. 
38 Laurence Boulle, Judi Jones, Virginia Goldblatt Mediation: Principles, Process, 
Practise (Butterworths, Wellington, 1998) 14. 
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between the disputants, the nature of the dispute, the amount at stake, 
speed and cost and the power relationship between the parties. 
IV MEDIATION UNDER NEW ZEALAND EMPLOYMENT 
LAW 
A common complaint about the employment law institutions 
under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was the legalistic - and 
therefore expensive and time-consuming - nature of the dispute 
resolution process. One of the aims of the Employment Relations Act 
2000 was to increase the speed with which problems are resolved and 
to reduce the cost of resolving them by reducing the litigious nature of 
employment relations . Moreover, it was thought that such "de-
legalisation" of employment relations would have the effect of 
assisting unions to function more effectively.39 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 has changed a lot in the 
process of employment dispute resolution in New Zealand. Mediation 
was also available before the introduction of the Act, for example for 
disputes of interest under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act 1894. Also subsequent legislation has provided for a range of 
mediation mechanisms. Under these mechanisms were, for example 
Dispute Committees under Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
1954 (sections 176 and 177), the Industrial Mediation Service in 
section 64 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973, the Mediation service 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987 (section 25), and Employment 
Tribunal mediation under the Employment Contracts Act (section 80). 
Up until the passage of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, there had 
essentially been a dual system for the resolution of disputes over the 
terms and conditions of employment. Employees who were covered 
by collective contracts - that is, awards or collective agreements - had 
39 
Paul Roth "Review: Employment Law" (2001) 4 NZ Law Rev 475, 476. 
17 
access to statutory dispute procedures. These were procedures gave a 
primary emphasis to the resolution of the dispute wherever possible by 
mediation or conciliation. Those employees covered by individual 
contracts, in contrast, generally had to resort to private litigation to 
resolve disputes over the terms and conditions of their employment. 
This procedure usually included and early involvement of lawyers in 
the dispute resolution process and an emphasis on adjudication by the 
courts.40 Under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 the same dispute 
resolution procedures applied to all employment contracts, whether 
individual or collective. One of the issues that arose when the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991 was passed was whether the greater 
emphasis on employment contracts - as opposed to employment 
relations - would lead to a greater involvement of lawyers in both the 
construction and the interpretation of employment contracts and, m 
tum, a greater emphasis on adjudication rather than mediation m 
resolving disputes and personal grievances. 41 A comparative study 
between the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 found that under the Employment Contracts Act 
there was "an increased reliance on adjudication as a dispute and 
personal grievance process"42 and that there was "a greater degree of 
formality in the new procedures"43. However, the members of the 
Employment Tribunal thought that the separation of the mediation 
function from the adjudication function had given them a greater 
freedom to mediate effectively. 
Finally, mediation has been given a huge legislative emphasis 
by the introduction of the Employment Relations Act 2000. Typically, 
40 John Deeks, Jane Parker, Rose Ryan Labour And Employment Relations Jn New 
Zealand (2 ed, Longman Paul Limited, Auckland 1994) 382. 
41 John Deeks, Jane Parker, Rose Ryan Labour And Employment Relations In New 
Zealand (2 ed, Longman Paul Limited, Auckland 1994) 384. 
42 Margaret Robbie Representation, Procedure and Process in Mediation and 
Adjudication since The Employment Contracts Act (mimeo, Business Studies 
Department, The Waikato Polytechnic, Hamilton 1992) 46. 
43 Margaret Robbie Representation, Procedure and Process in Mediation and 
Adjudication since Th e Employment Contracts Act (mimeo, Business Studies 
Department, The Waikato Polytechnic, Hamilton 1992) 47. 
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in mediations prior to the Employment Relations Act 2000 coming 
into force, the parties would not agree to mediation unless each 
committed to confidentiality.44 Under the Act, mediation is, with few 
exceptions, mandatory. Therefore, the Act imposes confidentiality 
. · · 45 
unless the parties or the relevant party consents to its waiver. 
Another interesting aspect is that the so-called inquisitorial approach 
has been introduced to dispute resolution where mediation has failed. 
Inquisitorial processes were not new in New Zealand. However, they 
have never been given such a heavy emphasis before and it is the fact 
that this approach is now linked with the specific powers given to 
those who are conducting the investigation - that creates the 
difference. 
The Act established the institutions dealing with employment 
disputes and provides the rules where these institutions are in charge. 
These institutions, which are established under Part 10 of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000, are the Mediation Service, the 
Employment Relations Authority and the Employment Court. 
In section 5 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 is defined 
that mediation in the meaning of the Act covers both mediation 
provided by the mediation service and private mediation. 
A Advantages of Employment Dispute Mediation 
The advantages which mediation represents to parties of 
employment disputes include according to Ralph Gardiner, a member 
of the former Employment Tribunal 46: 
(1) "Mediation is user friendly. In mediation, parties are truly 
in a low level informal tribunal. 
44 
45 
Crummer v Bench,~ark Building Supplies Ltd [2000] 2 ERNZ 22. 
Employment Relations Act 2000, Section 148(1). 
19 
(2) The parties control the outcome. Nothing can be imposed. 
Settlements, when achieved, are by mutual agreement of the 
parties. Adjudication, as with the Court, is a place in which 
disputes has been taken over by a machine. 
(3) A mediation hearing[ ... ] is available with little delay. I am 
sure everyone [ ... ] recognises that disputes are best resolved 
quickly before attitudes become hardened and memories go 
soft. 
(4) A mediated settlement represents finality. Adjudication on 
the other hand may well be the entrepot for judicial odyssey. 
(5) Mediation hearings and settlements are private. Parties do 
not subsequently read about themselves in the newspaper. 
( 6) Mediation is a cheap process. 
(7) Parties are not limited to those remedies provided by the 
Act. 
(8) Mediation 1s a far less time consummg process than is 
adjudication. 
(9) Mediation is a process which more so than adjudication 
enables parties to understand what is being done and said. 
(10) Finally, [ ... ] parties do not need to be represented at 
mediation hearings." 
46 Ralph Gardiner "Mediation of Employment Disputes" (Arbitrators Institute of 
New Zealand Seminar, Auckland 14 October 1993). 
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If one compares the listed advantages with the objectives of 
mediation in general, listed earlier in this paper47, one can see that 
mediation of employment disputes as practised in New Zealand is 
likely to achieve those objectives. However, I am critical concerning 
the last point. The hypothesis that it establishes an advantage for the 
parties that they do not need representation requires a closer 
examination. At a first sight, the idea of no party representation during 
mediation fits well into the picture of mediation of an informal and 
uncomplicated process of dispute resolution. On the other hand is an 
employment relationship often characterised by a power inequality 
between the parties. Representation can help to reduce this inequality 
during the process. A further aspect regarding inequality during the 
process is that most employers - in contrast to employees - inevitably 
have professional representation, even if this is only by their in-house 
human resource staff. Representatives can also assist their parties in 
viewing the issue in dispute in a legal context. It might be helpful if 
the parties actually recognise what the relevant case law and statutory 
law provides. That way the parties have the chance to reflect their 
expectations, which are of course driven by a lot of emotional factors 
as well, with the realistically and possibly achievable under legal 
aspects. The contra argument might be that representation is an 
additional cost factor for the parties. Furthermore mediation does not 
deal only with the legal aspects of a case. It also considers the 
emotional and psychological needs and expectations of the parties. For 
example in a personal grievance case, apart from a monetary 
compensation an apology can be the aimed outcome of the process 
and make parties even more satisfied with the outcome than the 
monetary compensation. However, under employee protection aspects 
one cannot argue that no representation is solely an advantage. I can 
only agree with Gardiner's statement if one reads the advantage not in 
the fact that there is no representation but in the fact that there is no 
representation necessary, which means the parties have the choice 
47 Refer to page 13. 
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whether they want representation. This opportunity 1s clearly an 
advantage. 
B The Mediation Service 
According to section 144(2) of the Act mediation services may 
include: 
(a) "the provision of general information about employment 
rights and obligations: 
(b) the provision of information about what services are 
available for persons (including unions and other bodies 
corporate) who have employment relationship problems: 
( c) other services that assist the smooth conduct of 
employment relationship problems: 
( d) other services ( of a type that can address a variety of 
circumstances) that assist persons to resolve, promptly and 
effectively, their employment relationship problems: 
(e) services that assist persons to resolve any problem with the 
fixing of new terms and conditions of employment." 
This definition is very broad and leads to the consequence that 
the Employment Relations Authority would immediately refer any 
dispute concerned with existing terms and conditions to mediation if 
mediation has not already been tried. 
C The Relationship between the Mediation Service and Private 
Mediation 
It is up to the parties' choice whether they take their 
employment relationship problem to the statutorily provided 
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mediation service or to a private mediator. The Employment Relations 
Act 2000 expressly states that in section 154: 
"Nothing in this part prevents any person seeking and using 
mediation services other than those provided by the chief 
executive under section 144." 
This distinction can cause problems in te1ms of the question 
whether private mediation shall be afforded the same benefits relating 
to confidentiality and settlements as the statutory mediation service. 
Some commentators take the view that the confidentiality provisions 
of the Employment Relations Act 2000 protect only mediation 
services pursuant to section 144 of the Act48. Green however, takes 
the view that the Act distinguishes between mediation services 
provided under section 144 by the mediation service from mediation 
services generally which can include both statutorily provided and 
private mediation.49 As an example one can present section 153, 
which expressly refers to the mediation services provided under 
section 144 to be compared with section 148(l)(a) which refers to 
"mediation services" without any reference to section 144. If one 
considers that the Act treats both private and statutory mediation 
services in the same way and if one further considers that there is a 
need to uphold and protect the integrity of the mediation process 
which the Act offers one has to agree with Green50 that there appears 
to be no reason why private mediation will not be afforded the same 
benefits in terms of confidentiality and settlement as that achieved 
thought the statutorily mediation services. 
The Employment Relations Act 2000 identifies employment 
topics that are so-called "dispute generators" and provides a process 
48 
Jason Bull ( ed) Brookers Employment Law (looseleaf, Brookers, Wellington 2000, 
para ER148-04 (2/10/00) 1-2169, last updated October 2003) . 
49 Phillip D Green Employment Dispute Resolution (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) 53 . 
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for their resolution. The following list contains areas of potential 
dispute where a mediator might have a positive influence on resolving 
the dispute and nurture the achievement of an acceptable resolution in 
the order of their appearance in the Act: 
• Freedom of association disputes, sections 7 to 11; 
• Access to workplace disputes, sections 19 to 25; 
• Independent review of information disputes, section 35; 
• Collective employment contract bargaining, sections 40 to 59; 
• Individual employment contract bargaining, sections 60 to 69; 
• Strikes and lockouts, sections 80 to 100; 
• Personal grievances, sections 101 to 128; 
• Contract interpretation disputes, section 129. 
Apart from this list mediation could assist in cases of reduction 
of issues and where the employment relationship is to preserve. 
D The Role of the Employment Relations Authority 
The de-legalisation process, as described above, came to be 
focused on the operation of the Employment Relations Authority. The 
Authority was intended to function as an informal but efficient forum 
for determining factual and legal issues at first instance. A number of 
procedural features serve to assist in the de-legalisation of the process 
at this level: 
• the informality of Authority procedure (sections 160 and 173); 
• the minimalist approach to recording its determinations (section 
174); 
• the de novo handling of issues in the Court (sections 179 and 183); 
50 Phillip D Green Employment Dispute Resolution (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Wellington, 2002) 53. 
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• restrictions on judicial review of the Authority (section 184); 
• the Court no longer has the function of advising or directing the 
Authority as to how it does its work (section 188(4)). 
If initial attempts at mediation are unsuccessful, issues proceed 
to the Authority. The Employment Relations Authority is supposed to 
be an inquisitorial body as opposed to one that adjudicates within a 
conventional adversarial framework. The explanatory note to the 
Employment Relations Bill stated: "It is intended that the Authority 
will make practical decisions quickly, with a minimum of detail, 
focusing on key issues and how to resolve them." In its report to the 
Employment and Accident Insurance Select Committee, the 
Department of Labour described the proposed operation of the 
Authority as: 
" [ ... ] not constrained by the formalities of a judicial hearing. 
The Authority has been given powers to operate flexibly given 
that it has a wide jurisdiction, and to act quickly and 
pragmatically. The wider powers of the Employment Relations 
Authority will allow it to take greater control of the 
proceedings, where that is appropriate given the nature of the 
employment problem or dispute, to get to the nub of a 
problem. Accordingly, section 157(1) describes the Authority 
as "an investigative body that has the role of resolving 
employment relationship problems by establishing the facts 
and making a determination according to the substantial merits 
of the case, without regard to technicalities". 51 
If a party is dissatisfied with the Authority's determination, it 
can elect to have the matter heard again in the Employment Court, this 
time within a conventional adversarial framework. 52 The Employment 
51 
Department of Labour "Report to the Employment and Accident Insurance Select 
Committee" (June 2000) 150. 
52 
Paul Roth "Review: Employment Law" (2001) 4 NZ Law Rev 475, 477-478. 
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Court oversees the role of the Employment Relations Authority and 
deals with specific legal issues. There is a stated emphasis on "equity 
and good conscience" and it is to uphold the emphasis of the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 on good faith bargaining.s3 
E Success of Employment Dispute Mediation 
Statistics show the mediation of employment disputes, as 
practised in New Zealand, is a success story. Most cases are being 
settled in mediation, as was the intention of the legislation.s
4 For 
example from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003 from 9,256 received 
applications only 1,155 have not been settled in the Mediation Service 
of the Department of Labour.ss The question is where this success 
comes from. The major advantages of mediation have already been 
described above.s6 They certainly build the basis for the success of 
mediation in employment disputes. It is also the special character of 
an employment relationship as an ongoing human relationship, which 
makes mediation especially suitable to solve disputes in that 
relationship. Mediation does not only solve monetary issues of a 
dispute but also personal and emotional issues. Furthermore, in 
mediation parties take responsibility for the outcome. That makes a 
settlement more likely. Another aspect regarding the Authority is that 
the determinations are reasonable predictable, at least regarding the 
remedies and that this might have an influence on the success rate of 
dispute settlement by mediation. 57 Mediation may help assess strength 
of cases. It brings clarity about the factual situation. That helps parties 
53 John Deeks, Erling Rasmussen Employment Relations in New Zealand (3 ed, 
Pearson Education New Zealand Limited, Auckland, 2002) 136. 
54 Paul Roth "Review: Employment Law" (2002) NZ Law Rev 557. 
55 Department of Labour "Annual Report of the Department of Labour - Te Tari 
Mahi - for the year ended 30 June 2003" 189. 
56 Refer to page 18. 
57 See for example statistics in Ian McAndrew, Kathryn Beck "Decisions and 
Damages: An Analysis of Adjudication Outcomes in the Employment Tribunal and 
the Employment Relations Authority" (New Zealand Law Society, Employment 
Law Conference, November 2002). 
26 
to evaluate their prospects realistically and may increase their 
willingness to settle in mediation. 
V GOOD FAITH IN MEDIATION 
Section 4 of the Employment Relations Act 2000 outlines the 
fundamental approach associated with good faith employment 
relations. The Act ' s promotion of productive employment 
relationships based on mutual trust places good faith at the centre of 
employment relations. There are a number of broadly defined matters 
where the duty of good faith applies: collective and individual 
agreement negotiations, employer and employee consultations, 
redundancy situations, and union access to workplaces. 
The question of the applicability of good faith requirements in 
mediation arises under different aspects. 
Firstly, I am of the opm10n that the certainty that all 
participants are required to act in good faith improves the quality of 
the whole process and can help make mediation more successful. 
Secondly, the question arises if the parties can actually compel 
each other to act in good faith. Consequently the question arises what 
happens to claims of the participants because of bad faith behaviour. 
Firstly, it is to find out whether there are any claims and whether or 
under which circumstances they are enforceable. This may vary from 
case to case. However, one always has to consider possible tort claims 
or other secondary claims such as negligence in the course of 
contracting, culpa in contrahendo. This context shows that it actually 
is important whether the parties acted in good faith, although one can 
not enforce acting in good faith of the parties itself. 
27 
Under New Zealand employment law another interesting 
aspect has to be taken into consideration: According to section 181 (2) 
of the Employment Relations Act 2000 the Employment Court may, 
in certain situations, request a "report in relation to good faith" from 
the Employment Relations Authority where a party has sought a 
hearing de novo. This report will give the Authority's assessment of 
the extent to which parties involved in the investigation have
58 
(a) facilitated rather than obstructed the Authority's 
investigation; and 
(b) acted in good faith towards each other during the 
investigation. 
If the Employment Court is satisfied that the person making 
the election "did not participate in the Authority's investigation of the 
matter in a manner that was designed to resolve the issues involved" 
the court may direct that the hearing not be a hearing de novo. 
59 These 
reports in relation to good faith under section 181 of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000 are a new initiative, which was introduced by the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 and have only been considered in a 
few cases. 60 Still , what constitutes behaviour which will be held to 
have "facilitated rather then obstructed" an Employment Relations 
Authority investigation, or result in a finding that a party had not acted 
in good faith during an investigation meeting, will require assessment 
of the particular characteristics of each case. The cited cases
61 also 
show the consequences for a party that treats the Employment 
58 Employment Relations Act 2000 Section 181(1). 
59 Employment Relations Act 2000 Section 182(2). 
60 See recently: North Harbour Windows and Doors (1999) Limited t/a Nu Look 
(North Shore) v Henman (5 May 2003) Employment Court Auckland AC 35/03 
Colgan J; Western v Warwick Henderson Gallery Limited (19 August 2003) 
Employment Court Auckland AC 45A/03 Colgan J; l eybourne v Eftpos Specialists 
(Auckland) Limited (27 August 2003) AC 48/03 Colgan J. 
6 1 North Harbour Windows and Doors (1999) Limited t/a Nu look (North Shore) v 
Henman (5 May 2003) Employment Com1 Auckland AC 35/03 Colgan J; Western v 
Warwick Henderson Gallery Limited (19 August 2003) Employment Court 
Auckland AC 45A/03 Colgan J; Leybourne v Eftpos Specialists (Auckland) Limited 
(27 August 2003) AC 48/03 Colgan J. 
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Relations Authority investigation as an opportunity to determine the 
strength of the other party's case, or acts other than "in a genuine 
attempt to resolve the case on its merits."62 These consequences will 
be more than just a sizeable costs award in favour of the other party. It 
may result in a party, who wants to have a hearing de novo, having the 
extent of their hearing restricted. 
However, there does not exist a similar rule for mediation 
processes. One can see this as an indication that good faith does not 
apply in mediation. In favour of this opinion one can use a systematic 
argument. If there is a rule for the Employment Relations Authority 
one could reason that the legislator intentionally did not invent such a 
rule for mediation. It might have been the legislator's intention that 
good faith requirements shall not apply during mediation. On the other 
hand, a closer look is necessary. One has to consider the unique 
characteristics of mediation. Actually the parties' behaviour during 
mediation cannot be investigated afterwards because of the absolute 
confidentiality of mediation. Confidentiality is a major characteristic 
of mediation and a key factor for the success of mediation. If one 
further asks for the intention of the legislator it seems unlikely that 
this intention was to exclude good faith standards from mediation. 
Good faith requirements were invented to the benefit of all parties. 
Everyone should be able to rely on the assumption that the other party 
is acting in good faith and that, if the other party fails to observe this 
code of conduct the party has to expect consequences. However, this 
argumentation only works under the assumption that it is generally 
possible that good faith requirements apply in mediation. I will 
analyse this question subsequently. Heretofore I set the hypothesis that 
if it is generally possible that good faith requirements apply m 
mediation there is no reason why they should not apply m 
employment dispute mediation under current New Zealand 
employment law. 
62 
North Harbour Windows and Doors (1999) limited tla Nu Look (North Shore) v 
Henman (5 May 2003) Employment Court Auckland AC 35/03 Colgan J, 15. 
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A Defining Good Faith in the Mediation Context 
The first problems arise if one tries to define good faith in the 
context of mediation. 
In the New Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000 does not 
deliver a useful definition. According to section 4(1)(a) just provides 
that the parties of an employment relationship must deal with each 
other in good faith. Section 32 of the Act provides extensive examples 
about good faith bargaining for collective agreements. However, this 
provision does not deliver a clear definition either. 
In the mediation further difficulties occur. As it is a vague and 
pretty unspecific term mediation itself is hard to define. 63 
Consequently it is not surprising that authors have difficulties in 
defining good faith in the context of mediation. Kovach delivered a 
very extensive description. According to her a definition should 
include the following aspects: 
"Compliance with the terms and prov1s1ons of [. . . a state 
statute or other rule . .. ] ; 
Compliance with any specific court order referring the matter 
to mediation; 
Compliance with the terms and prov1s10ns of all standing 
orders of the court and any local rules of the court; 
63 Refer to page .. . 
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Personal attendance at the mediation by all parties who are 
fully authorised to settle the dispute, which shall not be 
construed to include anyone present by telephone; 
Preparation for the mediation by the parties and their 
representatives, which includes the exchange of any 
documents requested or as set forth in a rule, order, or request 
of the mediator; 
Participation in meaningful discussions with the mediator and 
all other participants during the mediation; 
Compliance with all contractual terms regarding mediation 
which the parties may have previously agreed to; 
Following the rules set out by the mediator during the 
introductory phase of the process; 
Remaining at the mediation until the mediator determines that 
the process is at an end or excuses the parties; 
Engaging in direct communication and discussion between the 
parties to the dispute, as facilitated by the mediator; 
Making no affirmative misrepresentations or misleading 
statements to the other parties or the mediator during the 
mediation; and 
In pending lawsuits, refraining from filing any new motions 
until the conclusion of the mediation."64 
64 
Kimberlee K Kovach "Good Faith in Mediation - Requested, Recommended, or 
Reqmred? A New Ethic" (1997) S Tex L Rev 575, 622-623. 
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Although this list seems to be quite substantial, one has to 
confess that it merely just itemises behaviours, which are included in 
good faith. It rather seems to be a list of examples of good faith 
behaviour. This enumeration is not a universally valid. However, 
universal validity is characteristic for a definition, whereas it is 
supposed to apply to a variety of different cases. Some statutes and 
rules contain requirements of good faith in mediation.65 However, the 
same difficulties arise. For example, in the United States only one 
statute, dealing with agricultural lending mediations, contains a list of 
cases when the parties are not acting in good faith in the meaning of 
the statute: 
"[ ... ] not participating in good faith debtor/creditor mediation 
includes: failure on a regular or continuing basis to attend and 
participate in mediation sessions without cause; failure to 
provide relevant financial information; failure to designate a 
mediation representative with authority to make binding 
commitments, settle, compromise or mediate the matter; 
failure to provide written statements regarding alternatives; 
and participation in "other similar behaviour which evidences 
lack of good faith."66 
Remarkable is that this so-called definition again approaches 
the term by defining what bad faith behaviour is. Basically one can 
reduce the definition to a statement that "good faith is anything that is 
not bad faith"67. That might sound trivial. However, this approach 
finds its advocates since "it is bad faith that we seek to quash and 
since bad faith is presumably the rarer form of conduct"68 . Therefore it 
65 See for the US list in: John Lande "Using Dispute System Methods to Promote 
Good Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs" (2002) 50 
UCLA L Rev 69, 78-80. 
66 Minn Stat Ann§ 583.2l(l)(a) (West 2001). 
67 Robert S Summers "The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization" (1982) 67 Cornell L Rev 810, 818. 
68 Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
Disp Resolution 367, 372. 
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might be legitimate to focus on defining what 1s inappropriate 
behaviour by mediation participants. 
As already described, mediation aims to assist disputants in 
better understanding one another and in reaching a well-informed and 
mutually acceptable resolution of their conflict. Ideally this can be 
achieved through an open sharing of interests and parties learn more 
about each other. By that they can increase their ability to work 
collaboratively. These legitimate purposes of mediation are defeated 
when a participant acts contrary to this goal. 
Keeping that purpose in mind one can develop a list of 
examples of bad faith behaviour in the context of mediation. Such a 
list69 will include for example the following three situations: 
A party uses the mediation process primarily to gain strategic 
advantage in the litigation process; 
A party uses mediation to impose hardship rather than to 
promote understanding and conflict resolution; or 
A party neglects an affirmative material obligation owed to 
another participant, the mediator, or the court. 
B Sanctions for Bad Faith Behaviour 
If one has found out that a party to mediation was acting in bad 
faith as a next step the question occurs whether this behaviour is to 
sanction. This question is contested. Some authors promote sanction, 
others are opposed to it. 
69 
Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
Disp Resolution 367, 372. 
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1 Pro sanctions 
Proponents of enforceable good faith requirements contend 
that mediation just will not work absent the threat of sanctions for 
misconduct. They argue that litigants and attorneys accustomed to an 
adversarial "no holds barred" adjudicatory environment will not 
comport with mediation's ideals of openness, disclosure and fair play 
without the coercive threat of sanctions.70 The proponents of sanctions 
for bad faith summarise the problems as follows: 
"If good faith is not present, all we will be left with is a pro 
forma mediation, one more procedural task to be checked off 
of the long list of items to be covered in order to get to the 
trial. In fact, now, the term "pro forma mediation" is one that is 
heard when the parties, or more often their lawyers, arrive at 
mediation only because the court mandated them to do so. 
They unequivocally state that they have no intention of 
resolving the matter and really do not participate. These 
mediations are usually a waste of time for the mediator, a 
waste of time for the attorneys, unless it is used for free 
discovery or as trial preparation, and a waste of expense for the 
parties." 7 1 
Another author argues that parties to a private mediation who 
feel aggrieved by an opponent's lack of good faith possess a common 
law cause of action in contract and possibly tort. According to this 
7° Kathleen A Devine "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation, and 
Proposals" (1991) I I Rev Litig 83, 108-109; Alan Kirtley "The Mediation 
Privilege 's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation 
Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public 
Interest" (1995) 1995 J Dis Res I, 49, 50; Kimberlee K Kovach "Lawyer Ethics in 
Mediation: Time for a Requirement of Good Faith" ( 1997) Dispute Resolution 
Magazine 9 
71 Kimberlee K Kovach "Good Faith in Mediation - Requested, Recommended, or 
Required? A New Ethic" (1997) S Tex L Rev 575, 595. 
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opinion, every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith 
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement. The author 
reasons that every voluntary mediation involves a contract, either oral 
or written. In essence, the parties say to one another, "In consideration 
of you agreeing to meet and mediate this dispute, I agree to meet and 
mediate it as well." The implied covenant of good faith would, 
according to this opinion, attach to such a contract. This author 
theorises that victims of particularly egregious bad faith may even be 
entitled to recover punitive damages and believes that sanctions will 
compensate parties injured by bad faith conduct for their time and 
. . 72 
mconvemence. 
This opm1on seems to be reasonable. However, one has to 
admit that they present the same problems as traditional good faith 
analysis does, as for example defining good faith. 
As good faith issues also anse m other areas of law, for 
example in employment law, some authors suggest that case law from 
those fields can be instructive in the mediation context.73 Those 
analogies seem plausible. However, one may not be too uncritical in 
accepting them without further analysis. One has to analyse the case 
under mediation aspects, although there might be a legal requirement 
for good faith behaviour in litigation, as for example in the New 
Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000. 
72 
Maureen A Weston "Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: 
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good Faith Participation, Autonomy, and 
Confidentiality" (2001) 76 Ind L J 591, 644. 
73 
Kimberlee K Kovach "Good Faith in Mediation - Requested, Reconunended, or 
Required? A New Ethic" (1997) S Tex L Rev 575, 586-587; John Lande "Using 
Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good Faith Participation in Court-
Connected Mediation Programs" (2002) 50 UCLA L Rev 69, 90-91; Edward F 
Sherman "Court Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of 
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2 Contra sanctions 
Commentators opposed to sanctions recognise the problem of 
bad faith conduct, but believe that "the cure is worse than the disease". 
They see mediation's unique appeal as being its open and safe 
environment where disputants can freely and comfortably discuss their 
interests and views. Rules requiring good faith and threatening the 
imposition of sanctions, they contend, will hang over the parties "like 
the sword of Damocles", inhibiting the process rather than abetting 
it. 74 In conformance with that perception one can follow the statement 
that the imposition of a requirement to participate in good faith may 
also adversely affect the way the parties interact with each other and 
with the mediator. Parties may react cautiously and be "less likely to 
let down their litigation hair." This potential inhibition strikes at the 
core of mediation's attributes, the process's ability to offer participants 
an open and accepting environment in which to settle disputes. If 
parties are worried about the mediator's evaluation of their 
participation, the flow of information may be stemmed.75 Opponents 
of sanctions also contend that such rules could be abused just as 
proponents claim mediation is abused.76 Bullock and Gallagher, for 
example, stated that: "It is not worth the risk posed to the mediation 
process to impose a legally enforceable good faith requirement in 
order to achieve a highly uncertain benefit. A much more accessible 
alternative - and one which may be equally effective in practice - is 
for the mediator to request from the parties a voluntary commitment 
that they will use their best efforts to settle the case and that they will 
engage in good faith negotiations toward that end at the beginning of 
74 See for example: Ellen S Pryor and Will Pryor "Concurrent Mediation of Liability 
and Insurance Coverage Disputes" (1997) 4 Conn Ins L J 485, 499 . 
75 James J Alfini and Catherine G McCabe "Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: 
A Survey of the Emerging Case Law" (2001) 54 Ark L Rev 171, 180. 
76 See for example James J Alfini and Catherine G McCabe "Mediating in the 
Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law" (2001) 54 Ark L Rev 
171 , 205-206; Wayne D Brazil "Continuing the Conversation About the Current 
Status and the Future of ADR: A View From the Courts" (2000) J Dis Res 11 , 30-
33 ; David Hricik "Reflections of a Trial Lawyer on the Symposium: Dialogue with 
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the mediation session. Such an approach is much more in keeping 
with the realities of what brings parties to settlement and with 
mediation's role as a facilitator of the parties' self-determination."
77 
Opponents of sanctions believe that sanctions will cause mediation to 
become one more adversarial proceeding. 78 This concern might even 
be exacerbated by the vagueness of the good faith standards that have 
been proposed. Another author proposes in this context, for example: 
"Because a list of prohibited conduct cannot usually anticipate 
all violations, a test of good-faith participation should include 
an alternative totality-of-the-circumstances standard 
evidencing process abuse. Violations of the good-faith 
requirement can be measured objectively by a course of 
conduct abusive of the process, such as using the alternative 
dispute resolution process for the sole purpose of discovery or 
to outspend or harass the other side, and other coercion or 
pressure tactics."79 
Critics of sanctions fret further that such vagueness will lead to 
"satellite" litigation in which parties would fight endlessly over 
whether a violation has occurred. Rather than being an alternative to 
litigation, mediation could become a catalyst for litigation. 80 
The threat of hearings on whether a party acted in bad faith 
raises a possibility abhorrent to most mediation supporters: the 
77 
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mediator would likely be called to testify as to what happened. This 
threatens a fundamental premise of mediation-confidentiality. 81 
Indeed, advocates of good faith standards acknowledge the inevitable 
erosion in standards of mediator confidentiality that their proposals 
would cause. Weston contends concerning this problem that 
"confidentiality in alternative dispute resolution is popularly viewed 
as crucial to the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution and to 
participants' willingness to use such procedures. The confidentiality 
accorded to alternative dispute resolution proceedings is designed to 
promote the party candour, disclosures, and compromise discussions 
needed to resolve disputes. After the fact allegations of alternative 
dispute resolution bad faith conduct can undermine participants' trust 
in the confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution, create 
uncertainty, and potentially impair full use of the process. Yet the 
good-faith-participation requirements applied to party conduct in 
alternative dispute resolution proceedings are also designed to ensure 
process integrity and procedural fairness. The requirement is 
essentially meaningless if confidentiality privileges restrict the ability 
to report violations".82 
3 Compromise and own perspective 
The major problem with evaluating whether an act or omission 
is the result of bad faith depends ultimately on the actor's subjective 
motivation. The tenn "faith" already implies something inchoate, 
intangible and not measurable. Judgements about this will therefore 
inevitably entail guesswork. A few commentators have tried to 
overcome the distance between opponents and advocates of good faith 
Requirements: A Road Best Left Untraveled" (2001) 17 J Am Acad Maritim Law 
69, 70. 
81 Kevin Gibson" Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment" (1992) J 
Dis Res 25, 29. 
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standards. Some have suggested a distinction between "objective" and 
"subjective" good faith. 83 Objective good faith involves matters such 
as compliance with procedural rules and orders, completion and 
exchange of pre-mediation forms, and physical presence at the 
mediation. Subjective good faith entails matters more closely linked to 
a party's intent. It might include bargaining in good faith or bringing 
representatives with adequate settlement authority. Sherman stated: 
"I have no trouble with requirements imposed by rules or court 
orders as to reasonably objective conduct. These would 
include providing the other party and mediator with a short 
statement of 
( 1) the issues in dispute, 
(2) the party's position as to them, 
(3) the relief sought (including particularized 
itemization of all damages claimed), and 
(4) any offers or counter-offers already made."84 
He speaks in terms of "the minimal meaningful participation 
necessary to ensure the process is not futile."85 Kovach also discussed 
this minimal meaningful participation standard and acknowledges that 
"it is certainly worth additional deliberation and reflection". 86 Another 
suggestion is that there might exist a more useful dichotomy between 
good faith in procedural matters and good faith in substantive 
83 
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participation m the mediation. 87 Good faith m procedural matters 
includes such matters as physical presence at the mediation and 
completion of pre-mediation paperwork. Whereas good faith in 
substantive participation in the mediation can include, for example, 
bargaining strategy, making or refraining from making offers and 
selection ofrepresentatives. 
From a New Zealand Perspective a further argument for this 
distinction can be found in the rules for good faith behaviour in 
collective bargaining in the Employment Relations Act 2000. Part 5 of 
the Act is designed for the purpose of promoting collective 
bargaining. It sets out the requirements involved in good faith 
bargaining and it prescribes the ratification and application of 
collective agreements. Good faith collective bargaining reqmres 
according to the Act at least the following things88 : 
The parties have to agree on a bargaining process. 
The parties must meet each other. 
The parties have to consider and respond to bargaining 
proposals. 
The parties must recognise and respect the bargaining 
authority of the other side and avoid undermining this 
authority. 
The parties will provide the necessary information to 
substantiate claims. 
87 Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
Disp Resolution 367, 379. 
88 Refer to Employment Relations Act 2000 Section 35. 
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The parties must take into account relevant good faith codes, 
the proportion of employees who are union members, and the 
circumstances of employer and union (including the resources 
available to the employer). 
These requirements have a rather objective character. This behaviour 
can be controlled and analysed from an outside perspective. It will be 
shown subsequently where the advantages of this are and why 
evaluation of subjective good faith behaviour always involves special 
difficulties. 
The question of good faith in mediation turns on balancing two 
reasonable postulates. Sincere collaborative dispute resolution 
reqmres co-operation from all participants. Opponents of sanctions 
respond that mediation will never be an effective tool if parties' 
behaviour is coerced or second-guessed. 
It is to find out whether one can regulate some of the 
behaviour of mediation participants without 
. . . 
1mpmgmg their 
autonomy. Therefore, one has firstly to examine the consequences of 
bad faith conduct. Afterwards one may not neglect and therefore has 
to consider the dangers of employing coercive sanctions to regulate 
behaviour beyond the merely procedural. 
C The Need for Good Faith in Mediation 
Bad faith can have a major impact on mediation participants. 
This threat is not hypothetical. US American studies of party 
satisfaction with mediation indicate either slightly more89 or slightly 
89 
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less90 satisfaction than exists with adjudication. If one considers the 
advantages of mediation, one has to scrutinise these results. It seems 
surprising that the percentage of satisfied parties is not higher. One 
possible speculation among others may be that many of the 
disappointed mediation participants experienced bad faith conduct. 
Under this aspect one can hypothesise that decreasing bad faith 
behaviour during mediation will result in increasing party satisfaction 
with mediation. 
1 Objective good faith 
Courts employing their inherent power to enforce orders can 
regulate most forms of bad faith related to procedural matters. In the 
case of voluntary mediation, acts of objective bad faith might violate 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the contract to 
mediate. The fact that remedies already exist does not, however, 
vitiate the need to clearly identify what bad faith behaviour is 
proscribed. Mediation participants should know in advance for what 
conduct they have to expect sanctions. Certainty is an important 
aspect for parties m all kinds of dispute resolution processes. 
Furthermore, for mediation to gam widespread acceptance, 
participants who invest emotionally and financially in the process 
should be rewarded with fair and honest treatment from all others 
involved. A clear statement of the type of objectively measurable 
behaviour expected in mediations would further these ends. 
90 See for example the following studies : Deborah R Hensler "ADR Research at the 
Crossroads" (2000) J Disp Resol 71 and Deborah R Hensler "A Glass Half Full, a 
Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal 
Injury Litigation" (1995) 73 Tex L Rev 1587. 
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2 Subjective good faith 
However, it is questionable whether efforts to regulate 
bargaining strategies and other substantive decision-making 
behaviours of participants will do the same, because there are some 
major drawbacks to this attempt. The potential collateral damage that 
results from attempts to punish bad faith behaviour includes loss of 
confidentiality, satellite litigation over whether bad faith has occurred, 
inhibition of free expression, and loss of party autonomy. All these 
results are contradictory to the goals of alternative dispute resolution, 
which were already outlined in the fist part of this paper. Mediation 
shall permit the disputants to come together without fear of reprisal. 
The disputants shall share their interests and concerns and they ideally 
explore ways in which a mutually satisfying resolution can be found. 
Mediation is a kinder and gentler form of dispute resolution. It 
empowers the parties to control their destinies rather than surrendering 
dominion to the courts. Co-operation, collaboration, confidentiality, 
trust, and voluntariness are aspirations of mediation. 91 It is very 
doubtful whether these ideals can be achieved if there is too much 
control over the parties' behaviour during mediation. One can even 
think about the question whether excessive judicial intrusion into the 
mediation process threatens fundamental rights of the parties. 92 In the 
following I will outline the most important problems with punishing 
subjective bad faith behaviour. 
(a) Confidentiality issues 
Confidentiality is of enormous importance to the success of 
mediation. This is generally accepted - even advocates of far-reaching 
91 
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good faith standards acknowledge this importance. 93 A mediator must 
have the trust of all participants to be effective. Particularly in private 
mediations, mediators encourage parties to discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of their case openly. Disputants need to be sure that facts 
occurring during mediation will not be used against them in a court. 
The confidence established by that can be very helpful to set the stage 
for collaborative conflict resolution. A strict enforcement of good faith 
standards in substantive areas of mediation imperils the confidentiality 
of the process. 
The problem with "good faith" statutes and court rules is that 
they require mediators to report whether parties participated in good 
faith. This causes problems for the parties, but also for the mediators: 
"Mediators who know that the law requires the parties to participate in 
good faith are more likely to worry about whether they have a duty to 
report, on their own initiative, perceived violations of that duty. They 
also are more likely to fear that they will be pressed by a court or a 
party to divulge their private views on these matters, or to give 
testimony in a proceeding to determine whether sanctions should be 
imposed. Apprehension about such duties or pressures could create 
counterproductive distractions for mediators who are trying to build 
relationships and to help the parties during a mediation, and even 
could discourage some good mediators from agreeing to serve."94 For 
the parties it is more important that a negative report from the 
mediator will presumably cause a party to face the wrath of, if not 
sanctions from, the court. In the event of a hearing on bad faith 
sanctions, the mediator will likely be required to testify. Even if it 
were somehow possible to confine the mediator's testimony to a 
factual recitation of the behaviours underlying the claim of bad faith, 
93 Ellen E Deason "Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements : Contract Law 
Collides with Confidentiality" (2001) 35 U Cal Davis L Rev 33; Kevin Gibson 
"Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment" (1992) J Dis Res 25 , 29; 
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Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality" (1989) 41 Admin L Rev 315, 
324. 
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the parties' trust m the confidentiality of mediation would be 
shattered. 95 
(b) Causing additional litigation 
If mediation is used widely and properly, it should result in a 
less litigious culture of conflict. In a well-intentioned but naive effort 
to make mediation more effective, overly broad proposals for good 
faith requirements threaten exactly the opposite result. Rather than 
resolving pending litigation, a mediation that results in charges of bad 
faith may lead to additional legal proceedings-hearings on imposition 
of sanctions. Courts neither achieve judicial economy nor make the 
process less adversary when they condone bad faith conflicts. 
Although the mission of mediation is to promote an amicable 
settlement, placing good faith requirements on bargaining strategies 
may provide a disincentive to settle. It does not seem unlikely that if a 
contentious party or attorney senses an opportunity to gain strategic 
advantage from another party's mistake, he or she may re-direct 
attention away from negotiation to pursuit of a bad faith claim. By the 
same token, the other party may react with defensiveness. Fending off 
bad faith charges, rather than working collaboratively, may even 
become that party's primary focus. While rules that require a party to 
comply with reasonable mediation procedures should not have a 
chilling effect on the process, a court's scrutiny of bargaining 
decisions might. 96 This should represent a significant concern for 
mediation policymakers. 
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( c) Concerns regarding open expression 
Parties should take part in mediations openly and honestly. 
The threat of sanctions inhibits both openness and honesty. If bad faith 
behaviour is sanctioned in the case of party representation, this 
representative might be sanctioned because the court believed that he 
or she was inadequately prepared for the mediation. Fear of being 
charged with bad faith for not knowing every detail of the case might 
then inhibit lawyers from asking questions of other parties that could 
lead to greater understanding for everyone. 97 A corporate 
representative might avoid disclosing that his or her company has 
decided that it has no liability and intends to defend the case. Instead, 
he or she might make insignificant offers to avoid bad faith charges. A 
pointless mediation might occur simply because the defendant fears 
revealing its true position. Too broad good faith requirements imperil 
the highest aspirations of mediation. In a genuinely collaborative 
mediation, advocates work together even though their interests and 
those of their clients differ. Cooperation of this sort requires a certain 
mindset, one that seeks a good solution for all parties rather than 
individual triumph. Potential sanctions make such a mindset much 
more difficult to achieve. As parties contemplate statements of interest 
or settlement offers, their attention will inevitably be drawn to ways to 
avoid sanctions. Advocates will circle one another warily, looking for 
opportunities, and looking out for vulnerability. 98 Problem solving 
necessarily will play a secondary role. 
( d) Concerns regarding voluntariness 
Predominantly the voluntary nature of the process is seen as 
the most important advantage of alternative dispute resolution 
97 Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Conunentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
Disp Resolution 367, 393. 
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processes in general and mediation in particular. Alternative dispute 
resolution permits parties to wrest control of the case outcome from 
the court. Requiring parties to behave in a particular way may erode 
that voluntariness. In a frequently-cited article, Kovach and Love 
claimed that, "evaluative mediation is an oxymoron."99. An 
"evaluative" mediator assesses the strengths and weaknesses of legal 
claims, develops and proposes a settlement, encourages the parties to 
accept a settlement, and predicts court outcomes and/or impact of not 
settling. Kovach and Love argue that an evaluative mediator, by 
implicitly pressuring parties to adopt a particular view of the dispute, 
removes an element of voluntariness from the process. In this context 
another interesting questions arises: in how far is mandatory 
mediation compatible with the idea of voluntariness as a basic 
characteristic of mediation? Only a few commentators have argued 
that parties should not be compelled to mediate their disputes because 
it seems paradox to compel someone to participate in a "voluntary" 
process. 100 Nevertheless, court-ordered mediation is practised in many 
jurisdictions. For example, every United States District Court 
participates in some form of alternative dispute resolution. 101 Judges 
and court personnel have embraced mediation, in no small part, 
because they believe that it clears dockets. 102 Problems arise if the 
court involves itself in how the parties must act during the mediation. 
Then the process has morphed into something that is hardly to call 
"voluntary" anymore. Especially if a party is not free to make a small 
offer or no offer at all, in mediation, that party has lost, rather than 
gained, autonomy. 
98 
Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
Disp Resolution 367, 394. 
99 
Kimberlee K Kovach and Lela P Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is An Oxymoron" 
Alternatives to High Costs of Litigation (1996) CPR Institute for Dispute 
Resolution, Vol 14, No. 3, 31. 
'
00 
William F Coyne Jr "The Case For Settlement Counsel" (1999)14 Ohio St Jon 
Dis Res 367,391; Tina Grillo "The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for 
Women" (1991) 100 Yale L J 1545, 1581. 
'
0
' "The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998" 28 USC§§ 651-658 (2000). 
102 
Steven H Goldberg "Wait a Minute. This Is Where I Came In. A Trial Lawyer's 
Search for Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1997) BYU L Rev 653, 665. 
47 
A further aspect one might have to consider is that disputants 
may have many reasons to not settle. Some institutional defendants 
believe that paying any amount on a disputed claim will encourage 
others to initiate similar litigation. Litigants may want an issue 
adjudicated for its precedential value. Both plaintiffs and defendants at 
times feel that vindication of their position outweighs any economic 
efficiency associated with settlement. If, for any reason, a party does 
not want to make an offer to settle even a token offer they should have 
that right. Access to the courts does not exist absent the right to refuse 
to settle. Even in bad faith cases, courts still have to respect the 
principle that parties cannot be compelled to settle. The underlying 
principle one may not neglect is that the parties and not the court own 
the dispute. 103 
Furthermore, an aspect to consider is that one may not see 
docket clearing as a primary goal of any form of alternative dispute 
resolution. Mediation processes should be designed to improve the 
quality of settlements. Any attendant increase in the quantity of 
settlements ought to be seen as a secondary benefit. 104 
The most strident advocates of good faith requirements seem 
to believe that the force of the state is needed to protect good faith 
participants and the courts from the questionable tactics of litigators. 
They reason that courts can compel parties to behave properly through 
the coercive use of sanctions. However, if parties behave, mediation 
will work and if mediation works, people will participate willingly in 
good faith. 105 
103 Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
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Many people further mediation, as well as other forms of 
alternative dispute resolution, because they believe it will offer people 
more freedom to steer the course of their dispute. 106 By taking control 
away from the courts and placing it in the hands of the parties, 
"better" dispute resolution should occur. Empowerment and 
alternative dispute resolution work together as well as autonomy and 
alternative dispute resolution. 107 There is the danger that mediation 
could become the instrumentality by which party autonomy is 
threatened. 
D Problem Solving 
There is no general rule that can be applied and would solve 
the problems. Because we have many forms of mediation, rules of 
participant conduct must be implemented in many different contexts. 
In the case of private mediation, the parties can incorporate the 
standards into the mediation agreement. 108 In court-ordered 
mediations, the rules could be included in individual referral orders, or 
made a part of the local rules of court. No set of standards will serve 
as a prescription for good conduct in all circumstances. Adjustments 
for the nuances of local legal cultures must be made. Nonetheless, one 
can advocate the adoption of general guidelines for participant 
behaviour on a more global and authoritative level. Supporters of 
mediation as a form of dispute resolution need to communicate to the 
uninitiated what is expected of participants. This can be accomplished 
through widespread promulgation of standards of conduct. 109 
106 
See for example: Edward Brunet "Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract 
Model of Arbitration" (1999) 74 Tu! L Rev 39, 65 . 
107 
See for example: Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger Th e Promise of 
Mediation (led, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1994) 108-111. 
108 
Kimberlee K Kovach "Good Faith in Mediation - Requested Recommended or 
Required? A New Ethic" (1997) 38 S Tex L Rev 575, 61 7. ' ' 
109 
Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
Disp Resolution 367, 405 . 
49 
E Proposed Code of Good Faith 
According to the results found above a code of good faith in 
mediation could look as follows. 11° Comments regarding single rules 
will be made subsequently. 
(1) All parties have to attend the mediation. Personal 
attendance should be the regular case. 
(2) If a party wants to attend the mediation telephonically this 
party should advise all participants of the mediation a 
reasonable time in advance. Permission to a participation by 
telephone shall only be granted ifthere exists a good cause. 
(3) All parties are required to cooperate m prepanng all 
necessary documents. 
( 4) No party is under any obligation to make any offer at the 
mediation. 
(5) If a party does not intend to make an offer at the mediation, 
this party shall advise the other party of such intent. 
(6) Representatives of institutional parties shall participate 
only with authority to settle the dispute. 
Personal attendance should be the rule and other participation 
should only be allowed in exceptional cases. Mediation is a process of 
developing a solution - naturally this process requires the parties to 
11 0 Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations" (2002) J 
Disp Resolution 367, 398-402. 
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meet each other. Body language and facial express10n are very 
important. The missing of these non-verbal communication means can 
lead to misunderstandings and endanger the settlement. Another 
aspect is that parties who do not participate in person might be 
distracted because they are not in the quiet environment where 
mediation usually takes place. 
Failure to prepare documents for mediation is a classic form of 
objective bad faith conduct. An exchange of documents before the 
mediation can be very helpful. Parties get to know more about each 
other' s interests and views. This will aid them in preparing for the 
mediation. The same is valid for the mediator. A good preparation by 
the parties will make it easier for the mediator to lead the parties to a 
satisfying settlement. 
The rule that no party is required to make an offer may be 
controvertible. However, it ensures that no subjective good faith 
standards are enforced. Decisions about bargaining strategies are the 
province of the parties and their representatives. 
A notice of intention not to make an offer makes it possible for 
the other party to get prepared for that and think about alternatives. An 
alternative could be, for example, if the other party gets the right to 
cancel the mediation. 
A representative acting without the necessary authority to 
settle the disputes endangers the whole process. It is very frustrating 
for the other party if an institution delays a settlement or makes it even 
impossible by sending a representative with limited authority. This 
comes close to the situation when a party does not appear to the 
mediation. The other party may expect a representative who is able to 
settle the dispute because reaching a settlement is the purpose of 
mediation. 
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F Result Regarding Good Faith in Mediation 
The tension between the need for good faith in mediation and 
the desire to preserve party autonomy creates a dilemma. Permitting 
one party to use mediation to abuse the other seems unacceptable. 
Conversely, courts should not impinge upon party autonomy. A partial 
solution to this problem can lie in identifying behaviours that are 
undeniably inappropriate. This would include failure to comply with 
reasonable and clearly defined procedural rules. Beyond this point, 
however, it is dangerous to enhance the mediation process through use 
of coercive sanctions. One must reconcile oneself to the fact that many 
forms of bad faith behaviour cannot be avoided by the use of 
subsequent sanctions. Opposing sanctions for certain types of bad 
faith does not mean to suggest that the problem should not be 
addressed. Rather, one can say that the solution lies in preventing, not 
in punishing, such bad faith. Two useful suggestions for alternative 
means to achieve good faith conduct may be the following: First, 
educating future mediation participants with respect to mediation's 
potential will likely result in more attorneys and parties buying into 
the process. This, in turn, will result in less abuse of mediation. 111 
Second, it has been suggested that effective systems design will 
decrease bad faith behaviour. 112 If participants understand the process 
and if the process is well designed, mediation should offer cheaper, 
faster, and more creative resolution of disputes. This should result in 
widespread acceptance of the mediation process as an alternative to 
adjudication or negotiation. Self-interest of the parties will do what 
the coercive force of sanctions will not. 11 3 Considering this it should 
111 Roger L Carter "Oh, Ye Little of Good Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
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be possible that mediation works as a useful and successful means of 
alternative dispute resolution for all parties. 
VI CONCLUSION 
For New Zealand Employment Law this perception means the 
following: If one accepts that good faith requirements generally apply 
in mediation one can draw the conclusion that the good faith 
requirements of the Employment Relations Act 2000 also apply to 
mediation of employment disputes in New Zealand. 
Mediation is generally well suited for the resolution of 
employment disputes. An employment relationship is an ongoing 
human relationship. Therefore special issues arise. Often it is very 
important for the parties not only to get compensation in money for 
the violation of employment rights. Especially in personal grievance 
cases it might be even more important to get a true apology as 
outcome of the process. Mediation makes it possible that the parties 
talk more to each other. The procedure in litigation is rather 
characterised by the parties talking to the Court. If the parties have 
this possibility to really talk to each other in a less formal environment 
than in a court it is more likely that the real issues of the dispute come 
into consideration. This point is of enormous importance if one 
actually tries to obtain an ongoing employment relationship. An 
apology or the possibility to discuss the real issues of the employment 
relationship problem makes it also easier for the party to go on with 
his or her career without a burden. 
On the other hand, the other arguments usually named as 
advantages of mediation are less strong. Cost and time efficiency can 
also be achieved by litigation. Especially in the employment law field 
a specialised employment law court system can work very effectively. 
One can think about approaches like free employment law courts or a 
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first conciliation hearing. That can be arranged in a short time and 
gives the parties the possibility to reconsider their claims. A special 
problem is institutionalised mediation, as commonly practised. 
Alternative dispute resolution promotes such democratic values as 
self-determination and freedom from interference by the state. As 
alternative dispute resolution has become less alternative and more 
institutionalised, disturbing trends have emerged. Mediation, once a 
purely voluntary process, has become mandatory. This raises new 
problems. 
On the other hand, one should not stick too much to 
technicalities and definitions. It is far more important that the 
practised process is working effectively and satisfactorily for the 
parties. In so far, I consider institutionalised mediation as a kind of 
hybrid dispute resolution process, still mediation but already with 
characteristics of litigation. This kind of process can have its own 
advantages. As experienced with the Mediation Service provided by 
the New Zealand Department of Labour, institutionalised mediation 
can work very successfully. I see the advantages in such a system in 
the combination of the advantages of two systems: institutionalised 
mediation has still all the positive effects of mediation as described 
above. However, especially in the employment law context I see an 
advantage in the more of control that is established by the institution. 
Employment relationships are characterised by a power inequality 
between the parties. That can be dangerous in such an informal and 
confidential process like mediation. Institutionalised mediation 
ensures, in my opinion, rather that employees' rights will be observed 
during the process. The application of good faith standards m 
mediation is also under this aspect just a logical consequence. 
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